Ch 7 Star Wars; Hope vs. Reality

Ch 7 Star Wars: Hope vs. Reality

Star wars or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

what was it? A missile defense system designed by the U.S. government. The Rumsfeld Commission found a real thereat from "rogue states" in the near future.

important to know:
The SDI program was never was deployed and so much of the technical communication about the software had to do with prospective future and not the real present.
so... the technical communications-and the technical communicators behind them-therefore had to speculate about what would develop in their field rather than simply presenting objective information about existing devices. (most technical communication is aimed toward achieving future goals.)

it gave the U.S. public hope against the fear of nuclear attack, but this hope was based on unrealistic technical possibilities.

not unethical
more ethically responsible to have consulted more thoroughly with recognized technical and scientific experts on the feasibility of SDI.
The claims for the effectiveness of SDI intermixed past and present technical reality with future goals and wishful expectations.

___________________________________________
claims for the the Star Wars system were:
-exaggerated
-selectively represented
-misrepresented

technical communication:
-vague
-misleading

why?
because they were dealing with the hopes and speculations, not realistic expectations

CONTEXT

OVERVIEW OF SDI

A Complex System

CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
The report presents four "misapprehensions" regarding the stated goals of the president's plan:
1) Individual, seperate devices such as lasers are not the same as the total system in which they would be used together, whcih would be extremely complex.
2) SDI is unlike any prior technical program such as the Manhattan project.
3) Hopes for entirely new technologies cannot be realistic. "Such breakthroughs are not impossible, but theri mere possiblity does not help in judging the prospects for the perfect defense"
4) Accurate predictions canot be made about hte performance of this complex system. There is, and can be, no realistic test of the system beforehand; all posssible outcomes cannot be anticipated.

The chapter on software draws these three conculsions from a total of eight:
1) The nature of software and our experienceswith large, complex softward systems, including weapons systems, together indicate that there would always be irresolvable wque3stions about how dependable the BMD software was, and also about the confidence to be placed in dependability estimates.
2) No matter how much peactime testing were done, there would be no gurarantee that the system would not fail catasrophcially during battle as a result of a software error. Furthermore , experience with large, complex software systems that hvae unique requirements and use technology untested in battle, such as a BMD system, indicates that there is a significant propbability that a catastrophic failure caused by a softward error would occur in the system's first battle.
3) No adequate models exist for the development , production, test, and maintenance of software for full-scale BMD systems.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

SDI DOCUMENTS, PRO AND CON

Pro

Con

Parnas

STAR WARS BOYCOTT PLEDGE:

Patriot: Small-Scale SDI

Technical Claims about Air Operations

ETHICAL APPRAISAL:

Aristotle.


Kant.

Utilitarianism

Feminist Perspective and Ethic of Care.

CONCLUSION: